Challenge to Port Lease of Public Trust Land to Private Yacht Club Barred By 90-Day Statute of Limitations

The Court of Appeal held that the San Diego Unified Port District’s lease of public trust lands to a private yacht club was a discretionary act not subject to traditional mandamus, and that petitioner’s claim for administrative mandamus was barred by the 90-day statute of limitations. Herron v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 109 Cal. App. 5th 1 (2025)

Herron sued to set aside a lease granted by the Port to the Coronado Yacht Club. He alleged that the Port District breached its fiduciary duties under the Public Trust Doctrine, the San Diego Unified Port Act, and the Port’s Master Plan by leasing coastal land for a private club that excluded the general public. He sought a writ of traditional mandate to compel the Port to solicit bids for an operator that would manage the property for the benefit of the public at large. 

The Court rejected Herron’s claim for traditional mandamus, explaining that such relief is only available to compel the performance of a ministerial duty. The court reasoned that the administration of public trust lands necessarily involves the exercise of discretion. The San Diego Unified Port Act explicitly authorizes the Port District to use tidelands for specific purposes, including “yacht club buildings,” and does not mandate that such facilities be open to the general public at all times. Because the Port had the discretion to choose between compatible public trust uses, including a lease that permits the exclusion of the public for some portion of time, there was no ministerial duty to deny the lease or solicit public bids. 

The court further held that because the Port’s leasing decision was a discretionary exercise of quasi-judicial authority, the proper vehicle for judicial review was a petition for administrative mandamus. The lease at issue became final on January 1, 2019, but Herron did not file his petition until February 2023—over four years later. Consequently, the suit was barred by the 90-day limitations period in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.